I
" HE victory of communism is inevitable." This claim has been made since the consolidation of the Soviet Union, and it has been restated with relish by the Kremlin's supreme spokesman during his recent visits abroad. It rests on the argument that Russian society, in accordance with the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, has advanced from feudalism to capitalism and socialism, blazing a trail along which all other countries are bound to go. Thus the superiority of the Communist regime is asserted not merely on the basis of operational successes, but with reference to historical considerations which are ascribed to the "classics" of communism, and ultimately to Marx and Engels. How legitimate is this claim? How did the fathers of "scientific socialism"-and the Russian Marxists, including the pre-I9I7 Leninview the developmental position of Russia? A critical study of the facts reveals Marxist concepts of Russian society and revolution that are far more complex than, and profoundly different from, the socio-historical views offered by the Soviet ideologists.
Marx and Engels drew for their ideas upon many philosophical and socioeconomic concepts whose political intent was by no means uniform. Some are actually or potentially totalitarian; some are politically indifferent; and some are actually or potentially anti-totalitarian. This last group of ideas played a decisive role in creating the "manure of contradictions" (Danger der Widersprfiche)' that characterizes original Marxism.
Immensely significant in this respect is the contradiction between the goal of a total managerial socialist order envisaged by Marx and Engels and their insight into the atomizing and self-perpetuating quality of uncontrolled despotic power. They gained this insight as a by-product of a multilinear concept of development which they arrived at under the influence of the classical economists2 in the early i850's. This multi- 1 Marx used this formula to characterize what he considered the stimulating confusion in the ideas of Ricardo (Karl Marx, Theorien iiber den Mehrwert, 3 vols., Stuttgart, 1921 in: World Politics 12: 4(July 1960), pp. 487-508.
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linear concept led them to doubt a necessary progress from ancient ("slaveholding") to medieval ("feudal") society,3 the first step in the allegedly Marxist unilinear scheme. It led them to consider "Asiatic" or "Oriental" society as a self-perpetuating order headed by a peculiar type of absolutism, Oriental despotism. And it led them to class Tsarist Russia as a semi-Asiatic country dominated by an Orientally despotic state. Before taking this position, Marx and Engels had fitted Russia into a concept of universal development built primarily upon Fourier's sequence of social epochs: savagery, patriarchalism, barbarism, and civilization.4 In i848 Engels described Russia as a "patriarchal-feudal barbarism,"5 and Germany as a "civilized" nation at an early stage of bourgeois prominence.6 Both countries were dominated by a "patriarchalfeudal absolutism."7 Engels obviously considered such a regime compatible with a predominantly agrarian as well as with a predominantly "bourgeois" society, the former eventually evolving into the latter. At the close of i848 Marx viewed the "West" as representing "civilization" and the "East" (mainly Russia) as representing "barbarism."' In February i849 Engels invoked the concept of "different stages of culture" as the criterion for judging the relation between Russia and the Western Slavs.9 In the same context he declared that the historical position of a nation was determined by "the stage of its societal development" (gesellschaftliche Entwicklungstufe). This unilinear approach explains why, despite Russia's suppression of the Hungarian revolution (in i849), Engels in i85i considered Russia more progressive than Poland: "There is not a single moment when Poland, even compared with Russia, successfully represents progress."" 3 Engels saw the classes of medieval Europe emerge not from the "swamp" of the decaying slaveholding society of antiquity, but from a barbarian tribal "gens" society, which, avoiding any elaborate system of slavery, advanced directly toward medieval society with its relatively mild form of servitude (Friedrich Engels, Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigenthums und des Staats, Stuttgart, 1921 Thus, during their Continental period and for some years thereafter,"2 Marx and Engels appraised Russia's historical position within the framework of a unilinear concept of development. But in i853 their position underwent a radical change. Marx, who since the summer of i85i had intensely reread the classical economists,"3 figured prominently in this development. But Engels, who was devoting most of his spare time to the study of military matters,14 was in close communication with his friend through letters and visits.15 He shared significantly in this reorientation, which determined Marx's and Engels' view of Asiatic society and Russia for the rest of their lives.
II
It was probably Engels who, in an article published in the New York Daily Tribune on April i9, i853, first called Russia "semi-Asiatic." But although he was thinking of Russia's "condition, manners, traditions and institutions,"1 he did not specify their Asiatic peculiarities. In an article published two days later, he described Russia's regime, "whereever it is not mixed up with feudal institutions," as representing "a military occupation, in which the civil and judicial hierarchy are organized in a military manner, and where the people have to pay for the whole."17
The new Asiatic concept that Engels was groping for emerged in a discourse that occurred during the summer of i853. It crystallized in three letters (two by Marx and one by Engels) and in three articles (all by Marx).
On June 2, i853, Marx, commenting on remarks of Engels on Oriental cities and religion,18 called the absence of landed property "the real 12 Cf. Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels, Revolution und Konterrevolution in Deutschland, Berlin, I953, p. 8i. This series of articles, which appeared in the New York Daily Tribune from September i85i to December i852 under the name of Marx, was actually written by Engels (MEGA, III, I, pp. 24If., 244, 259f., and passim). The above-cited juxtaposition of the "civilized West" and the "barbarian East" was dated February i852. 13 key even to the Oriental heaven.""9 In his answer on June 6, Engels stated approvingly that "the Orientals did not arrive at landed property, not even in its feudal form."20 In his opinion this was due to the "desert"-like conditions prevailing "from the Sahara across Arabia, Persia, India, and Tartary and the most elevated Asiatic highland. Here artificial irrigation is the first condition of agriculture, and this is a matter either for the communes, the provinces, or the central government." Hence the Oriental governments always had a department of public works.2' In an article dated London, June io, i853, Marx included Engels' ideas on the relation of aridity to irrigation and public works in the Orient. But he went further. He mentioned two "circumstances" as characteristic of Oriental society: "the Hindoo, on the one hand, leaving, like all Oriental peoples, to the central government the care of the great public works, the prime condition of his agriculture and commerce," and the population "dispersed, on the other hand, over the surface of the country, and agglomerated in small centers by the domestic union of agricultural and manufacturing pursuits." The resulting village communities had "a/ways been the solid foundation of Oriental despotism."22
In his letter of June I4 to Engels, Marx restated the two "circumstances": "The public works the business of the central government" and "besides them the whole realm, not counting a few large cities, dissolved into villages which have a completely separate organization."23 Commenting on the role of these villages, he added: "I think one cannot imagine a more solid foundation for the stagnation of Asiatic despotism."24 In these formulations Marx was shifting his emphasis from the property aspect (he had noted that private landownership probably existed in certain regions of Asia25) to the isolation of the villages as the decisive reason for the "stagnation of Asiatic despotism."
In an article dated July i9, i853, and devoted to international aspects of the "Eastern question," Marx contrasted certain "semi-Eastern" developments that involved Russia and certain "completely Eastern" de19Ibid ., Pa 477 20Ibid., p. 480; italics added. 21 Ibid. Engels' argument suggests his familiarity with the pertinent ideas of at least one classical economist, Richard Jones, whom Marx had studied as early as June i85i (KMCL, p. 107). In a pioneer work on Asiatic society written in i83I, Jones pointed to the significance of "that great tract of sandy desert" that stretches across the "old world." His list of these desert areas begins with the Sahara, Egypt, Syria, Persia, India, and ends with "Tartary" and northernmost China. It concludes with the sentence: "This soil can be made fruitful only by irrigation" (Richard Jones, An Essay on the Distribution of Wealth, and on the Sources of Taxation, London, i831, pp. 119ff. velopments that involved China.2" In view of the two circumstances which Marx on June io and I4 had called characteristic of "all Oriental peoples," the conclusion seems warranted that he considered Russia "semi-Eastern" because, unlike China, where both circumstances were present, Russia knew only the second. This conclusion is confirmed by Marx's and Engels' continuing insistence that the dispersed village communities were the solid foundation of Oriental despotism. Obviously, in their opinion, the second circumstance did not create the specific order called "Asiatic society"-this was the function of the hydraulic factor-but it was sufficient to perpetuate its dominant institution, Oriental despotism.
In a third article, dated July 22, i853,27 Marx again discussed India as a representative of the "old Asiatic society." Speaking of "village isolation," he mentioned "the absence of roads," which left the individual rural community "almost without intercourse with other villages." Such a situation meant "the dissolution of society into stereotype and disconnected atoms." In i854 Marx further elaborated upon the organizational atomization of the Asiatic peoples by stating that the Asiatic forms of domination differed from European absolutism in that they prevented "the growth of common interests" among their subjects. "Oriental despotism" tolerated municipal self-government only insofar as it was convenient and not opposed to the regime's direct interests.28 From i853 on, Marx and Engels interpreted the Tsarist regime as an Oriental despotism. In i855 they began to consider its possible origin. The hydraulic factor being absent in Russia--they do not even mention it-introduction from outside was suggested as the likely explanation. In i855 Engels 
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Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century. In consistence with the Soviet endeavor to hide Marx's "Asiatic" interpretation of Tsarist Russia, this series, which constitutes his only sketch of Russian history, has not been included in the official Soviet edition of Marx's and Engels' works.3"
Marx's analysis ran as follows: The Mongol conquest destroyed Russia's proto-feudal society by compelling the Muscovite Tsars to "tartarize" Muscovy.34 The Tatar Khans and their Russian agents combined the ruthless expansion of despotic power with an internal system of "enslavement. "" According to this interpretation, the Mongols introduced the two-pronged policy;36 the early Tsars implemented it in Muscovy;37 Peter the Great "generalized" it.38 And in Marx's time Russia's political attitude was in substance still what it had been at the end of the Mongol period: "A simple substitution of names and dates will prove to evidence [sic] that between the policy of Ivan III and that of modern Russia, there exists not similarity, but sameness."39
In these "preliminary remarks" Marx treated certain aspects of a "marginal" Oriental society40 that have great relevance for the study of Russian history and total power. Recent investigations confirm that among the three major Oriental influences-Byzantium, the Mongols, and Ottoman Turkey-it was the second that imposed on Russia a nonWestern, absolutistic service state.4" Early Chinese, Mongol, and Russian sources permit us to identify the methods of Chinese statecraft with which the Mongols were familiar when they conquered and reorganized Russia."2 For some years after i857 Marx concentrated on the analysis of Western industrial society, but in the first volume of Das Kapital (i867) he again called the self-sufficient village communities "the key to the secret 38 This is the case in the first edition (1923-I948) and in the second of the unchangeability (Unterinderlichkeit) of Asiatic societies." "The structure," he continued, "of the economic key elements (der okonomischen Grundelemente) remains untouched by the storms in the political sky."43 And in the i870's the two friends, who had closely followed the Russian Emancipation, commented with growing frequency on Russia's societal order. In i875 in an article, "Soziales aus Russland," which criticized the Russian revolutionist Tkachev, Engels repeated the key Marxian thesis that "the complete isolation of the individual village communities from each other [was] the natural foundation of Oriental despotism." He continued: "From India to Russia this societal form, where it prevailed, has always produced it, and has always supplemented it."" In the Anti-Dfihring, which Engels wrote from i876 to i878 and which he read in full to Marx,45 he again asserted that the old (tribal and rural) communities had been "over millennia the foundation of the crudest type of state, Oriental despotism, from India to Russia."46
Thus Russia was part of the Eastern and not the Western world. In i877 in a letter to the editors of the magazine Otechestvennye Zapiski, Marx admonished his Russian readers to remember that the socio-historical development described in Das Kapital pertained only to Western Europe. He warned them against attempting "to transform my historical sketch of the genesis of capitalism in Western Europe into a historicophilosophic theory of the marche generate imposed by fate upon every people, whatever the historic circumstances in which it finds itself."47
In i88i Marx repeated this warning in a letter to Vera Zasulich. He again described the isolated village communities as "always" constituting the basis for a "centralized despotism."48 And he remarked that in pre-Mongol Russia such communities were already present, apparently "imposed by the vast extension of the land," but, he added, they were "largely consolidated by the political fate Russia had to endure after the Mongol invasion. 
III
The ideas of Marx and Engels on Russian society entered Russia through various channels. Marx's Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (i859), which in the preface distinguished the "Asiatic" from the "ancient," "feudal," and "bourgeois" modes of production, was known from i86o.53 Das Kapital, Volume I, which called the isolated village community "the key to the secret of the changelessness of Asiatic societies," appeared in a Russian translation in I872.54 Plekhanov's translation of the Communist Manifesto, with a special preface by Marx and Engels which contained a crucially important statement on Russia's socio-historical perspective, was published in i882. Engels' i875 article, "Soziales aus Russland," with the i894 postscript, was translated into Russian by Vera Zasulich and published with a preface by Plekhanov in i894, one year before the young Lenin visited these two famous revolutionaries in Switzerland. Marx's letter of i877 circulated in Russian, first in handwritten copies and then in printed form.55 From it Plekhanov cited Marx's warning against universalizing the Western European experience in his book, The Development of the Monist View of History,56 which first appeared in i895 and which, Lenin approvingly noted, "helped to educate a whole generation of Russian Marxists."57 Engels' Anti-Diihring was soon known to the Rus- 50 sian Marxists;58 Lenin quoted it from i894 on. From the late i890's he also quoted Das Kapital, Volume III, which was translated into Russian in i896 and which, in addition to numerous observations on the "Asiatic" state, includes Engels' comments on the fiscal oppression of the Russian and Indian village communities by the despotic state. In I9I3 Lenin studied Marx's and Engels' correspondence. In his abstracts from Marx's i853 letters on India, he reproduced Marx's thesis on the lack of private landed property as the key to the "Oriental order," and he paraphrased the two "circumstances" as follows: "The Asiatic villages closed and self-sufficient (natural economy)-the basis of the Asiatic order + public works of the central government.""
The dean of Russian Marxism, Plekhanov, readily accepted the Marxian concept of an Asiatic society and its application to Russia.80 And although Marx's letter of i877 somewhat embarrassed him and his comrades, because the narodniki used it to bolster their thesis that in Russia, unlike the West, a primitive agrarian communism might directly evolve into modern socialism,6' he steadfastly adhered to the idea that the economic order of Muscovy resembled that of "all great Oriental despotisms"6 and that Petrinean Russia "completed and systematized what Muscovy began."6" The Russian counterpart of the feudal survivals that shaped the restoration after the French Revolution he took to be "our old attachment (kreposz) of land and peasants to the state."64 Under such conditions, Plekhanov said, citing Kliuchevsky, the landowners were essentially a group of "serving" men,"5 and as long as these conditions were unshaken66 social upheavals only led to the restoration of the old political and economic order.67 58 In i889 a resume and excerpts were published by N. Ziber in the magazine Slovo. A full translation by V. J. In the same context as that in which Plekhanov propounded these ideas, the Menshevik leader, Martinov, declared that Russia's peculiar economic order, including the nationalization of the land, was "the foundation of our Asiatic despotic order of society."68 Parvus' views of Russia's semi-Asiatic conditions became conspicuous on the eve of the i905 Russian revolution.69 In i906 Trotsky began to speak of Russia's "semi-Asiatic societal conditions," of a state that seemed closer to Asiatic despotism than to Western absolutism, and of the cities of old Russia that resembled "the cities of Asiatic despotism." 70 Lenin cited Marx's four antagonistic modes of production-the first among them being the Asiatic-when he entered upon his career as a Marxist in I894,7' and he again cited them when he wrote his biography of Marx in I9I4.72 During these twenty-one years Lenin expressed his awareness of Russia's "Asiatic system" (the Aziatchina) with varying consistency and usually in connection with his criticism of Tsarist "absolutism." After a somewhat vague beginning, he sharply stressed the Orientally despotic character of Tsarism. He pointed to the "Asiatic" quality of Russia's institutions.73 He denounced Russia's rural order as representing a state of "bondage" (krepostnichestpro); and he warned against calling this order "feudal."7" It was at this time that Lenin applied to Russia such designations as "political slavery,"75 the "politically enslaved state,"76 and the "monster" government.77 These were designations that Marx had used in his "Diplomatic History."
After the i906 discussion of the dangers of an "Asiatic restoration," Lenin employed the "Asiatic" concept more sparingly, but he did not discard it.78 In February I9I4, debating the problem of national selfdetermination with Rosa Luxemburg, he defined the "Asiatic despotism" of contemporary Tsarism as a "totality of traits" with specific 68 Protocols, P. 90 "economic, political, and sociological characteristics." And he added: "As everybody knows, such a type of state shows great persistence where the economy of the country in question is entirely patriarchal and where there is almost no commodity economy and class differentiation."79
IV
Obviously then, and contrary to the official Soviet claim, Marx, Engels, and the prewar Lenin did not view Russia as having the same socio-historical background as the West. Nor did they equate the Russian "bourgeois" revolution with the bourgeois revolutions of Western Europe. On the eve of a Western bourgeois revolution, as Marx saw it, the dominant contradiction was the conflict between the ruling, but decaying, feudal-absolutistic order and the rising bourgeoisie. In contrast, the dominant contradiction in Tsarist Russia was the conflict between the ruling, but decaying, Orientally despotic order and its enemies: oppositional nobles, the peasants, and the incipient bourgeoisie.
In this sense, Engels in i875 described Russia as "held together by an Oriental despotism whose arbitrariness we in the West simply cannot imagine," and which "from day to day comes into more glaring contradiction with the views of the new enlightened classes."80 Ten years later he spoke of the "contradictions" in Russian society as "forcibly held together by an unexampled despotism."' When Engels in i875 pointed to these contradictions, he believed that the anti-despotic forces were gaining strength and that Russia was moving toward a social revolution. How could this happen in an institutional order that, according to Engels and Marx, was stationary, "the structure of the economic key elements" remaining untouched by any political revolution? As a matter of fact, neither Marx nor Engels conceptualized his thoughts on this extremely important problem; but their comments on India and Russia (and Turkey) imply that such a "diversive revolution"82 might result from the impact of outside forces. With regard to India, Marx saw the Asiatic order as loosened by a nonAsiatic type of foreign rule-British colonialism. "English interference ... produced the greatest, and to speak the truth, the only social revolution ever heard of in Asia."83 In Marx's and Engels' opinion, Russia's advance to a social (in con- 79 trast to a purely political) revolution would be initiated by two factors: a catastrophic military defeat and the proximity of the West. When, after the Crimean War, both factors were combined, the frightened Tsarist bureaucracy introduced far-reaching technical changes (an increase in railroad building and an intensification of industrialization) and equally far-reaching social reforms (preeminently, the emancipation of the serfs).8" In i859 and i86o Marx listed as revolutionary forces the peasants and the oppositional nobles who wanted a constitution.85 He expected-and his analysis proved correct-that the Emancipation would strengthen both the autocratic state and peasant hostility to it.86 In i875 Engels found the revolutionary spirit growing among the peasants and the young bourgeoisie, and from this time on both he and Marx were convinced that the Russian revolution was in the making.87 He was not certain in i875 whether the Russian anti-despotic or the Western socialist revolution would break out first.88 But in i877 Marx felt that the Russian revolution was imminent;89 and from then on the two friends argued that the trail-blazing Eastern revolution might spark the Western proletarian revolution, and that the latter might lead to the preservation-and communist development-of the Russian village community. In i882, in their preface to the Russian edition of the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels put it this way: "If the Russian revolution becomes the signal for a proletarian revolution in the West, so that each complements the other, the present Russian common ownership of land may serve as the starting point for a communist revolution. "90 In i894, when the village community was disintegrating rapidly, Engels again voiced the hope that "the overthrow of Tsarist despotism" would stimulate "the victory of the modern industrial proletariat" in the West.9" He expected the victorious socialist West to show the Russians wie man's macht (how to do it)-that is, how to use the remnants of the old communal property "greatly to abbreviate the development toward a socialist society."92 This then is the original Marxian model (Model I) of the Russian revolution. Because the Tsarist regime was increasingly weak and increasingly oppressive, the Russian anti-despotic revolution would probably precede the Western socialist revolution. Unfolding its strength, it might give the signal to the Western revolutionists, who in turn might show the Russians wie man's macht. To repeat: the outbreak of the Russian revolution did not depend on a preceding Western revolution. And although a subsequent ("complementary") Western revolution would be highly desirable, it was not a necessary condition for the success of Russia's anti-despotic bourgeois revolution.
V
The role of Tsarism has been recognized by most historians of the Russian revolution.93 Tsarist absolutism shaped the character of the entire revolutionary movement; in a peculiar way it affected its Bolshevik wing, which emerged under Lenin's leadership in 1903. Thought and action going hand in hand, the advance toward a Bolshevik policy expressed itself in significant "Leninist" modifications of the Marxist doctrine.
These modifications ought to be the concern of any immanent critique of Marxism-Leninism. Hence we turn eagerly to Herbert Marcuse's study of Soviet Marxism, which includes the rise of Leninism and which, as the author tells us, proceeds by means of an immanent critique in that it "employs the conceptual instruments of its object, namely, Marxism."94 It hardly needs saying that any analysis of Soviet society and ideology which restricts itself to the method of the immanent critique is inconclusive. Nevertheless, such an approach can provide extremely valuable insights. It is for this reason that Soviet Marxism is so disappointing. Although Marcuse recognizes history as the core of the Marxist position,95 he fails to use, as his conceptual instruments, 
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WORLD POLITICS the socio-historical ideas of original Marxism. Instead, and without enlightening his readers on this point, he employs the altered concepts by which the Soviet ideocrats are hiding Marx's, Engels', and the prewar Lenin's views of Russian society and revolution. Marcuse's supposedly Marxist formula of "consecutive social systems" suggests a unilinear scheme of development,96 and his three examplescapitalism, the feudal system, and the Roman Empire97-all happen to be Western types of societies. In keeping with this conceptual framework, he describes pre-I9I7 Russia as "backward" without qualifying this term.98 To him, Russia's backwardness was what decisively differentiated it from the modern industrial West. And he discusses the problems of the Russian bourgeois revolution in terms of Marx's critique of the Gotha Program of the German Social Democrats99-that is, in terms of a developmental pattern (a capitalist society with a feudal past)100 which, according to Marx and Engels, was not Russia's pattern.
Having thus misrepresented the Marxist socio-historical tenets, Marcuse goes on to claim that Lenin made the first step toward Leninism in I902 (by means of a new concept of the revolutionary party) and the second step in i905 (by means of a new peasant strategy) because the rise of monopoly capitalism and imperialism had brought about a "decline in the revolutionary potential in the Western world.""10 This explanation fits Stalin's thesis that Leninism, as the "Marxism of the eve of imperialism and the proletarian revolution," arose during the "period of undivided domination of the opportunism of the Second International."102 But it does not fit either Lenin's original concept of the Russian revolution-which was that of Marx and Engels-or his appraisal of the Western proletariat, which until 19I4, and despite certain reformist-revisionist tendencies, he admired for its proper political day-to-day improvements to an essentially political struggle against the Tsarist regime.105 From then on, and for definitely internal reasons, Lenin began agitating for the creation of a vanguard party in which an elite of professional militants would stand above the proletariat.' 06 Lenin was in line with the Marxian concept of Russian society when he distinguished between the most oppressive Western government and Tsarist absolutism.107 And he was in line with the Marxian concept of the Russian revolution when he expected it to give the "signal" to the Western workers,108 who then might show the Russians wie man's macht.109 In these matters Lenin and most of his orthodox Marxist comrades were in agreement. But he parted company with many of them when, to justify his proposals for an authoritarian party organization, he stressed the peculiarity of Tsarist despotism1s and demanded that the party operate under a quasi-military discipline and a bureaucratic centralism.1"' He thus was recommending the organizational methods of the very despotic regime that he and his comrades were combating.
VI
Lenin's innovations of I902-I903 did not involve a change in the original Marxist model of the Russian revolution. But such a change did occur in i905-i906, during and immediately after the first Russian revolution.
Russia's defeat by Japan and the revolution of i905 weakened the Tsarist regime profoundly, without, however, causing its collapse. Lenin, who early in i905 had re-emphasized Russia's "virginal" Asiatic despotism,"' at the close of the year found Russia's "purely capitalistic contradictions still to a very large extent covered by the contradiction between 'culture' and the Aziatchina, between Europeanism and the Tatarshchina, capitalism and bondage."'13 And early in i906 he saw "the autocracy entirely restored."'14
But while the revolution failed to attain its goal, it revealed explosive tensions in the villages. And the possibility of uniting the small, but organized, proletarian forces and the potentially revolutionary peasantry led Lenin and Trotsky to present new schemes for revolutionary procedure.
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Trotsky's starting point, like Lenin's, was the recognition of Russia's semi-Asiatic background. Trotsky specifically followed Parvus, who, early in i905, had "shed light on those social peculiarities of backward Russia, which, true enough, were already well known, but from which no one before him had drawn all the necessary inferences."'15 In precapitalist Russia, Parvus argued, the "cities developed on the Chinese rather than on the European model." They constituted "administrative centers, purely official and bureaucratic in character." Hence the Russian middle class was weak, and the workers could and should take the lead in the revolution, ultimately establishing "a workers' democracy."'1 Trotsky, who wholeheartedly accepted Parvus' Asiatic interpretation of the Russian state and city,117 went beyond his friend politically when he proposed that under these conditions the Russian workers, supported by the peasants, could and should advance from the democratic to the socialist revolution. However, he held that when this was done, they could avoid being overwhelmed by the peasants only if their forces were joined "with the forces of the socialist proletariat of Western Europe."'18 It was in this context, which involved the interpretation of the Russian state as "semi-Asiatic" and of Russia's precapitalist cities as entirely "Asiatic," that Trotsky introduced his version of the concept of the "permanent revolution."'19
Lenin likewise became convinced of the necessity of the Western revolution, but he arrived at his conclusion in a different way. He urged that the revolutionary peasants be made the "allies" of the small Russian working class in a new type of bourgeois-democratic revolution which would lead to the establishment of a "revolutionary-democrat dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry."' To attract, and control, the peasants, Lenin from i906 on advocated a revolutionary land distribution based on state ownership-that is, he advocated the nationalization of the land.
Supported by the Mensheviks, Plekhanov strongly objected to this program. Lenin's new policy, he believed, would create an untenable revolutionary position, and the nationalization of the land would again 115Leon Trotsky, Stalin, ed. and tr. by Charles Malamuth, New York and London, I951, p. 430 (hereafter cited as Trotsky 1941). According to Trotsky, the preface to Trotsky's pamphlet "Until the Ninth of January," in which Parvus expressed these ideas, "entered permanently into the history of the Russian Revolution" (ibid., pp. 429f.). Cf. Lenin's respectful reference to this preface in April I905 (Lenin, SWG, vii, p. 265 make the state the master of the rural economy as it had been in the heyday of Russia's "old semi-Asiatic order."'' Thus, if the Western revolution did not take place-and only a stupid general would base his plans on a coincidence of all favorable conditions'22-there would surely be a restoration of Russia's old order. Such a catastrophe, Plekhanov stated at the Stockholm Party Congress, could be avoided only if the land, instead of being nationalized, were entrusted to self-governing "municipal" bodies. 128 Lenin tried to minimize the threat of the "Asiatic restoration."'124
But reluctantly he admitted its existence: "Does the word 'nationalisation' facilitate the restoration of the semi-Asiatic conditions, or is this done by certain economic changes ?" And he added: "It is precisely nationalisation that far more radically eliminates the economic founda-
Pressed by Plekhanov, Lenin admitted the danger inherent in his new strategy, but he was willing to take the risk to gain his end-a revolutionary dictatorship controlled by his party. He contended that a restoration could be held off temporarily by the relative guarantee of a radical democracy that tolerated no bureaucracy and no standing army.'26 There existed, however, only one absolute guarantee against the restoration: the Western revolution that would follow and aid the aimed-at Russian bourgeois-democratic revolution. "A socialist revolution in the West ... is the only absolute guarantee against restoration in Russia. "127 Thus, alongside the Marxian model (Model I) of the Russian revolution, which fundamentally was upheld by Plekhanov and the Mensheviks, there emerged in i905-i906 a new model (Model II) of the Russian revolution. Its two main variants, one presented by Lenin and one by Trotsky, differed in important details, but both sought the creation of a dictatorial regime, which for its ultimate success depended on a victorious Western socialist revolution. If this "absolute guarantee" failed to materialize, then the restoration was inevitable.
In the October revolution of I9I7 the Bolsheviks established a dictatorial regime. They immediately nationalized the land; and soon they also gained control of industry. They quickly nullified Lenin a police."28 And they failed to stimulate Lenin's only absolute guarantee: the socialist revolution in the West. According to Lenin's premises of i906-i907, such a situation could result only in a restoration. And according to the Marxist analysis of Russian history which Lenin had upheld for over twenty years, this restoration could be only an "Asiatic" restoration.
VII
From i906 to I9I4 Lenin was embarrassed by certain implications of the Asiatic concept; hence he employed it hesitatingly. With the rapidly increasing chances for a revolution in Russia and Europe as World War I advanced, he abandoned this concept, which tended to dampen the revolutionary ardor of his followers. In State and Revolution (i9i6-I9I7) he discussed "the revolution" in terms of Marx's Gotha comments as if Russia had had no (semi-) Asiatic past and was not threatened with an "Asiatic" future. In fact, this book, which had the avowed purpose of presenting "all the most essential passages in the works of Marx and Engels on the subject of the state,"'29 contains no references to the type of state that Lenin for over twenty years had denounced and combated in Russia: Oriental despotism. Consequently State and Revolution does not once cite Marx's main work, Das Kapital, or The Theories on Surplus Value, both of which analyze aspects of Asiatic society, Asiatic production, and the Asiatic state. After the Bolshevik victory of October i9i7, Lenin did not openly reject Marx's ideas on "Asia," but in his i919 lecture on "The State" he listed not four, but three, exploitative class societies, "slavery, feudalism, and capitalism." '130 Manifestly, for Lenin the implementation of a new policy (new compared with the previously professed principles of a popularly controlled democracy) necessitated this break with his earlier Marxist position. But in Russia, where the writings of Marx and Engels and the prewar Lenin were widely known, such an about-face was more easily initiated than completed. Objections by veteran Marxists had to be silenced. This was done effectively by a conference on the Asiatic mode of production held in Leningrad in I93I. At this conference the main spokesman of the Stalin-controlled Politburo bluntly declared: "What is really important is to unmask it politically, and not to establish the 'pure truth' as to whether the 'Asiatic mode of production' existed or not. '131 In I938 Stalin settled the disconcerting problem in a somewhat unusual manner. In Chapter IV of The History of the CPSU he cited Marx's "famous" preface to his Critique of Political Economy. But instead of reproducing the core passage in full, he stopped just before the sentence in which Marx lists the Asiatic mode of production as the first of his four major antagonistic societal conformations.'"2 The new Outline of Marxist Philosophy (i958) follows the post-October Lenin and the I938 Stalin by speaking of only three antagonistic class societies: slavery, feudalism, and capitalism.13'
The Soviet ideologists have not stated openly that their appraisal of Russia's developmental position differs from the one given by Marx, Engels, Plekhanov, and the prewar Lenin. Rather they create the impression that here as elsewhere they are adhering in an orthodox fashion to the Marxist position. Basing our argument on the doctrinal standards to which they pay lip service, we may say that the masters of the USSR are forging their socio-historical pedigree. According to the original Marxian views, the Soviet Union did not advance from a feudal to a capitalistic order; and according to the i906 elaboration of these views, the Russia of I9I7 did not move progressively toward socialism, but retrogressively, from a weakened semi-Asiatic society and an ephemeral capitalism to a reinvigorated system of Oriental despotism.
Furthermore it is improper to assert with reference to Marxism-as the professedly immanent critics, Deutscher'l' and Marcuse,'85 have done-that in the USSR technical improvements compel democratization. Marx and Engels established their correlation of technical and socio-political change essentially for the multicentered societies of the West. Although they cannot have been unaware of the many technical innovations in Asiatic society, they maintained that, under Oriental despotism, the people were economically and politically atomized, and therefore incapable of overthrowing this type of power structure from within.
VIII
The fact that I have reviewed here in some detail the Marxist analysis of Asiatic society and Russia does not mean that I consider it sufficient for the purposes of today's research. True, the developmental concept of the classical economists, which Marx and Engels adopted, ranked among the greatest ideas of the nineteenth century; but it was crude and deficient, and it remained so in the Marxist version, which elaborated several of its economic features but shied away from its class aspect. Marx's two "circumstances"-especially the second, the dispersed villages-do not adequately define the core institutions of Oriental (or, as I call it, "hydraulic") society; and the notions of Marx and Engels regarding the "semi-Asiatic" variant of this conformation sense rather, than describe the underlying problem. Their discussions of the transition of both "Asiatic" and "semi-Asiatic" society to a multicentered (Western) society are suggestive but unsatisfactory. And their deterministic position obscures the existence of a genuine choice in such open historical situations as that presented by Russia's democratic revolution in 19I7. Even the idea of an Asiatic restoration, which Plekhanov and Lenin quite legitimately derived from their Marxist premises, is valuable only to the degree to which we realize that the contemplated restoration was bound to result in a modern, industry-based, totalitarian order which was more than a replica of Oriental despotism. As we know now, this new order shares several essential features with the old institutional conformation, especially the despotic state and the ruling bureaucracy. But the new regime with its total managerial economy democratic evolution" (Isaac Deutscher, Russia: What Next?, New York, 1953, p. 221).
185 Marcuse uses his own type of dialectical argument; yet his conclusions closely approach those of the Neo-Trotskyites. He calls the Soviet bureaucracy "a separate class," but avoids calling it a ruling class-it is neither homogeneous nor secure (Marcuse 1958, p. iii) and it "represents the social interest in a hypostatized form" (ibid., p. ii8). Soviet theory has a "magic" quality; it thus assumes "a new rationality" (ibid., p. go); eventually "technical progress will overtake the repressive restrictions imposed at earlier stages" (ibid., p. I88).
involves patterns of social, personal, and ideological control that are qualitatively different from, and operationally far more oppressive than, the old semi-managerial despotism."'8
But whatever their deficiencies, we must become familiar with the Marxist concepts of Asiatic society and Russia's Oriental despotism. Contrary to a widely held view, Marx's and Engels' comments on these matters are much fuller and much more numerous than their comments on the revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism. And contrary to the cynical opinion that these comments are meaninglessanyone can prove anything with quotations from Marx and Engelsthere is a definite pattern in the Marxist ideas on Russia and Asia, a clearer and more consistent pattern in fact than the one that underlies Marxist ideas on the transition to socialism.
Adequate knowledge of the "Asiatic" aspects of the Marxist doctrine enables us to make a truly critical appraisal of the socio-historical claims of the Communist ideologists. It also enables us to recognize significant contradictions in the views of Lenin and Trotsky. Not a few Aesopian utterances of the post-October Lenin indicate his awareness of an approaching "Asiatic restoration": after Kronstadt he described the new Soviet economy in terms almost identical with those he had used in I9I4 to characterize Russia's Asiatic despotism."87 These utterances give a Dostoevskian meaning to Lenin's efforts to uphold at all costs the totalitarian order which had come into being under his guidance.
Trotsky's case is even more pathetic. In i930 and as late as i940 Trotsky repeated his earlier views on Russia's Asiatic background,'88 but he refrained from applying the Asiatic argument to Stalin's regime because, obviously, he was afraid that it might hit not only his immedi-ate target, but the whole power system which he had helped to create and which, until his death, he hoped to rejoin.
There were moments of ambivalence in the careers of Lenin and Trotsky when, for the sake of power, they avoided or discarded the "Asiatic" concept they had upheld for so long. The present masters of the USSR, unhampered by any such memories, see in it nothing but a nightmarish threat to the central myth of their "progressive" state and destiny.
